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Psychologists and laypeople all desire explanations for 
human behavior. Whereas psychologists’ efforts to 
explain behavior demand years of formal training, lay-
persons’ efforts seem to demand no formal training at all. 
In fact, most 3-year-old children already have the ability 
to produce culturally acceptable explanations of other 
people’s behavior (Bartsch & Wellman, 1989). This funda-
mental aspect of human social cognition has been the 
object of theories and research in disciplines ranging 
from social psychology (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Heider, 
1958) to developmental psychology (Gopnik & Schulz, 
2004) to the philosophy of mind (Davidson, 1963; 
Dennett, 1989). These disciplines largely converge on the 
view that folk explanations of human behavior are the 
product of a cognitive ability that is distinct from the one 
used to explain nonsocial events of a natural origin. In 
the research reported here, we used functional MRI 
(fMRI) in conjunction with a novel behavioral task to 
examine the idea that folk explanations of behavior 
require specialized cognition.
Lay explanations of human behavior usually rest on 
attributing a person’s observable behavior to an inferred 
mental state, such as their motive or belief about the 
behavior (Davidson, 1963; Dennett, 1989; Malle, 2004). 
These causal attributions draw on what has been vari-
ously termed a folk psychology or theory of mind, that is, 
a culturally shared conceptual framework that specifies 
the meaning of mental terms, both as they causally relate 
to each other (e.g., anger causes aggression) and to 
observable behaviors (e.g., embarrassment causes blush-
ing; Apperly, 2012; Bartsch & Wellman, 1989; Malle, 
2004). Thus, folk psychology provides a powerful con-
ceptual framework for making attributions about the 
social world (Heider, 1958; Heyes & Frith, 2014). For attri-
butions about changes observed in the physical world, 
however, folk psychological concepts are much less 
powerful. Such changes are best understood using a dif-
ferent set of concepts that describe (either lay or scien-
tific) laws of nature (Dennett, 1989).
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Abstract
People typically explain others’ behaviors by attributing them to the beliefs and motives of an unobservable mind. 
Although such attributional inferences are critical for understanding the social world, it is unclear whether they rely on 
processes distinct from those used to understand the nonsocial world. In the present study, we used functional MRI 
to identify brain regions associated with making attributions about social and nonsocial situations. Attributions in both 
domains activated a common set of brain regions, and individual differences in the domain-specific recruitment of one 
of these regions—the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC)—correlated with attributional accuracy in each domain. 
Overall, however, the DMPFC showed greater activation for attributions about social than about nonsocial situations, 
and this selective response to the social domain was greatest in participants who reported the highest levels of social 
expertise. We conclude that folk explanations of behavior are an expert use of a domain-general cognitive ability.
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Thus, attributions about social and nonsocial situa-
tions clearly demand the use of different domains of 
causal knowledge. However, it remains unclear whether 
they also require distinct cognitive processes operating 
on that knowledge. In prior work, we have shown that 
attributions about human behavior selectively activate an 
anatomically well-defined left-hemisphere brain network 
that prominently includes regions of the medial and orbi-
tofrontal prefrontal cortex, precuneus, temporoparietal 
junction (TPJ), and anterior superior temporal sulcus 
(aSTS; Spunt & Adolphs, 2014; Spunt, Falk, & Lieberman, 
2010; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012a, 2012b; Spunt, Satpute, 
& Lieberman, 2011). By exclusively focusing on attribu-
tions about human behavior, these studies could not 
examine an important unanswered question: Does this 
network implement an attributional process that is 
domain general or one that is specifically tied to the 
social domain?
Work in social neuroscience suggests that the func-
tions of this network might be specific to the social 
domain. It has long been known that psychiatric illness 
and brain lesions can cause dramatic changes in social 
cognition while sparing ostensibly domain-general exec-
utive functions (Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Samson, Apperly, 
Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004). Similarly, numerous 
neuroimaging studies suggest that brain regions support-
ing social judgments dissociate from those that support 
similar nonsocial judgments (Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012; 
Mitchell, 2009; Van Overwalle, 2011). However, because 
these studies have typically relied on directly comparing 
responses to social stimuli with responses to nonsocial 
stimuli (e.g., Martin & Weisberg, 2003; Mason, Magee, 
Kuwabara, & Nind, 2010; Mitchell, Heatherton, & Macrae, 
2002; Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2005), their findings 
could be, in part, driven by domain-specific expertise, 
attention, and motivation—factors that might lead the 
social domain to place relatively stronger demands than 
the nonsocial domain on cognitive processes that are 
intrinsically domain general (Grelotti, Gauthier, & Schultz, 
2002; Tarr & Gauthier, 2000). To address this possibility, 
we used fMRI in conjunction with a novel behavioral task 




Twenty-one adults from the Los Angeles metropolitan 
area participated in the study. Two individuals were 
excluded after they participated, 1 because we discov-
ered that the individual had an incidental brain abnor-
mality, and the other because of a recruitment-screening 
error. This left 19 participants for the analysis (13 males, 
6 females; mean age = 28.32 years, range = 21–46). 
Sample-size determination was based on the first author’s 
previous fMRI studies of social attribution in healthy 
adults, which used experimental manipulations that were 
conceptually similar to the one used in the present study 
and consistently found robust effects (mean N = 19, SD = 
5.67, range = 10–29; Spunt & Adolphs, 2014; Spunt et al., 
2010; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012a, 2012b; Spunt & 
Lieberman, 2013; Spunt et al., 2011).
Participants in the present study were screened to 
ensure that they were right-handed, were neurologically 
and psychiatrically healthy, had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, spoke English fluently, had an IQ in the 
normal range (as assessed using the Wechsler Abbreviated 
Scales of Intelligence; Wechsler, 1999), and were not 
pregnant or taking any psychotropic medications at the 
time of the study. All participants provided written 
informed consent according to a protocol approved by 
the California Institute of Technology Institutional Review 
Board, and they received financial compensation in 
exchange for participating.
Procedure
Participants’ brain activity was measured while they per-
formed the social/nonsocial why/how task, a modified 
version of the yes/no why/how task, which we recently 
validated for investigating social-attributional processing 
both behaviorally and neurally (Spunt & Adolphs, 2014). 
In that study, participants answered attributional (why) 
and factual (how) questions about the emotional facial 
expressions and intentional hand actions depicted in 
photographs (Fig. 1). This basic protocol of the why/how 
task permits an isolation of the attributional process of 
interest by allowing researchers to subtract brain activity 
associated with factual (“how”) questions from brain 
activity associated with attributional (“why”) questions. 
Because each photograph is evaluated using both ques-
tion types, only the level of attributional processing dif-
fers. In this way, the why/how manipulation has been 
used to isolate the brain regions specific to attributional 
processing in the social domain.
For the present study, we followed three criteria in 
constructing an orthogonal why/how manipulation in the 
nonsocial domain:
a. Stimulus: The stimulus being evaluated does not 
show humans, human-like entities, or outcomes 
that are typically the result of intentional human 
behavior.
b. Task content: The attributions that participants are 
evaluating do not contain the mental and social 
concepts typically featured in attributions about 
human behavior.
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c. Task structure: The task period during which brain 
activity is measured is structured so as to prevent 
the occurrence of task-irrelevant social inferences. 
This criterion is important given the well-docu-
mented human tendency to spontaneously anthro-
pomorphize nonsocial objects and events (Epley, 
Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007). In fact, the possibility 
of task-irrelevant social cognition has been used 
to explain previous findings showing that some 
nonsocial-reasoning tasks also activate regions in-
volved in social reasoning (Van Overwalle, 2011).
The resulting task featured a 2 (question: why vs. 
how)  × 3 (stimulus: nonsocial scenes vs. emotional 
expressions vs. intentional actions) factorial design. 
Henceforth, we use the label “social” to collectively refer 
to the two categories of human behavior (emotional 
expressions and intentional actions). Each of the three 
stimulus categories featured 54 naturalistic photographs 
acquired from a variety of online stock photography 
sources (see Fig. 1 for examples and Figs. S1–S3 in the 
Supplemental Material available online for the full stimu-
lus sets). The nonsocial stimuli depicted events 
commonly attributed to changes in nature, for instance, 
extreme weather and seasonal changes. We used 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to collect normative ratings of 
photograph valence from approximately 30 native-Eng-
lish-speaking U.S. citizens. This was achieved by asking 
participants to rate “How POSITIVE (pleasant) vs. 
NEGATIVE (unpleasant) is each photo?” on a 7-point 
Likert scale (1 = extremely positive, 4 = neutral, 7 = 
extremely negative). An independent samples t test 
showed that photograph valence did not differ signifi-
cantly across the social (M = 3.647, SD = 0.577) and non-
social (M = 3.731, SD = 0.742) stimulus domains, t(160) = 
0.307, p = .759.
All why and how questions were in a binary format 
(the answers required only a “yes” or “no” response). 
Table 1 displays the 36 questions used in the study. For 
the social situations, attributional questions regarded the 
mental state of the person in the photograph (e.g., “Is the 
person expressing gratitude?”), while factual questions 
regarded an observable motor behavior (e.g., “Is the per-
son reaching for something?”). For nonsocial situations, 
attributional questions regarded a natural causal process 








Is it a result of 
a rainstorm? 
rainstorm? 















2,500 ms (max) 
Time
Fig. 1. Sample block sequences from the social/nonsocial why/how task. Participants answered yes/no questions about photographs of 
events that were either social (another person’s emotion or action) or nonsocial. Each block began with a yes/no question that was either 
attributional (it asked participants to consider an explanation of an event) or factual (it asked participants to consider a concrete detail of an 
event). A sequence of nine photographs followed, with a key phrase from the question appearing as a reminder between photos. For each 
of these nine photos, participants were instructed to quickly and accurately answer the question presented at the beginning of the block.
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while factual questions regarded an observable object or 
event (e.g., “Is the photo showing colorful flowers?”). 
Each question was paired with five photographs designed 
to elicit the response “yes” and four photographs 
designed to elicit the response “no.” These pairings were 
selected based on the responses of an independent sam-
ple of Mechanical Turk respondents. Each pairing was 
evaluated by approximately 30 native-English-speaking 
U.S. citizens. We retained only those pairings that elicited 
a consensus response. An independent-samples t test 
showed that consensus for nonsocial pairs (M = 92.704%, 
SD = 6.532) did not differ significantly from consensus for 
social pairs (M = 92.593%, SD = 6.650), t(160) = 0.101, p = 
.920. In our subsequent analysis of participant perfor-
mance, consensus data were used to code responses as 
correct or incorrect.
During MRI scanning, photographs were presented to 
participants in blocks of nine, with each block associated 
with one of the 36 questions in Table 1. For each block, 
participants were first shown a question (e.g., “Is the per-
son being affectionate?”), which was followed by a series 
of nine target photographs. For each of these photo-
graphs, participants were instructed to answer the ques-
tion presented at the beginning of each block. To reduce 
working memory load, we presented a key word from 
the question on screen as a reminder (e.g., “affection-
ate?”) for 500 ms after each photograph except the final 
one. Participants had 2,500 ms to respond to each photo-
graph. If they responded before 2,500 ms elapsed, they 
automatically advanced to the next part of the block. For 
this reason, block durations were contingent on response 
times (RTs). However, total task duration was not, as 
block onsets were fixed. The order and onsets of ques-
tion blocks were optimized to maximize the efficiency of 
separately estimating the why > how contrast for each of 
the three stimulus categories. This was achieved by gen-
erating the design matrices for 1 million pseudorandomly 
generated designs, and for each, summing the efficien-
cies of why > how contrast estimation for the three cate-
gories. The most efficient design was retained and used 
for all participants.
Prior to entering the scanner, participants were told 
they would be performing a photograph-judgment test in 
which they would answer yes/no questions about vari-
ous kinds of photographs. They were then shown two 
example trials and were invited to ask the experimenter 
questions if they did not fully understand the task. Finally, 
they were told that they would have a limited amount of 
time to respond to each photograph. Immediately prior 
to performing the task in the scanner, participants 
 performed a brief practice version of the test featuring 
stimuli not used in the experimental task.
Stimulus presentation and response 
recording
Stimuli were presented and responses recorded using the 
Psychophysics Toolbox (Version 3.0.9; Brainard, 1997; 
Table 1. Question Endings Used in the Social/Nonsocial Why/How Task
Stimulus category Attributional questions (why) Factual questions (how)
Nonsocial scenes  . . . Spring season?  . . . clouds?
  . . . a drought?  . . . colorful flowers?
  . . . a forest fire?  . . . dry ground?
  . . . a hurricane?  . . . moving water?
  . . . a rainstorm?  . . . palm trees?
  . . . result in rain?  . . . smoke?
Emotional expressions  . . . being affectionate?  . . . gazing up?
  . . . celebrating something?  . . . looking at the camera?
  . . . expressing gratitude?  . . . looking to the side?
  . . . expressing self-doubt?  . . . opening their mouth?
  . . . in an argument?  . . . showing their teeth?
  . . . proud of themselves?  . . . smiling?
Intentional actions  . . . competing against others?  . . . carrying something?
  . . . doing their job?  . . . lifting something up?
  . . . expressing themselves?  . . . putting something on?
  . . . helping someone?  . . . reaching for something?
  . . . protecting themselves?  . . . using a writing utensil?
  . . . sharing knowledge?  . . . using both hands?
Note: For nonsocial scenes, why questions began with either “Is it going to result in . . .” or “It is the result 
of . . . ,” whereas all how questions began with “Is the photo showing . . . .” For both categories of social 
scene (emotional expressions and intentional actions), both why questions and how questions began with 
the string “Is the person . . . .”
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Pelli, 1997) operating in MATLAB (Version 2012a; The 
MathWorks, Natick, MA). An LCD projector was used to 
show stimuli on a screen at the rear of the scanner bore 
that was visible to participants through a mirror posi-
tioned on the head coil. Participants were given a button 
box and made their responses using their right-hand 
index and middle fingers.
Personality measurement
For the purposes of exploratory individual difference 
analyses, we asked participants to complete several self-
report questionnaires measuring aspects of an individu-
al’s motivation and ability to understand other people’s 
behavior. We explored the moderating effect of these 
measures to add additional constraint on interpreting the 
nature of effects observed in our primary analyses.
The short form of the Empathy Quotient questionnaire 
(Wakabayashi et al., 2006; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 
2004; α = .871) measures the drive to understand and 
respond appropriately to the internal states of other peo-
ple (e.g., “I am good at predicting how someone will 
feel”). The Social Curiosity Scale (Renner, 2006; α = .885) 
measures a general interest in acquiring novel informa-
tion about other people (e.g., “Other people’s life stories 
interest me”). Items 10 and 11 on the Social Curiosity 
Scale were deemed inappropriate and were omitted from 
the study.1 Finally, participants completed the Attributional 
Complexity Questionnaire (Fletcher, Danilovics, 
Fernandez, Peterson, & Reeder, 1986; α = .929), which 
measures the tendency to produce relatively complex 
and sophisticated explanations of human behavior (e.g., 
“I really enjoy analyzing the reasons or causes for peo-
ple’s behavior”). Participants also completed the Gossip 
Functions Questionnaire (Foster, 2004). However, because 
responses to this questionnaire demonstrated poor reli-
ability (average scale α = .359), they were not retained 
for further analysis.
Image acquisition
All imaging data were acquired at the Caltech Brain 
Imaging Center using a Siemens Trio 3.0 Tesla MRI scan-
ner outfitted with a 32-channel phased-array head coil. 
During the social/nonsocial why/how task, we acquired 
394 T2*-weighted echo-planar image (EPI) volumes (slice 
thickness = 3 mm, 46 slices, repetition time = 2,500 ms, 
echo time = 30 ms, flip angle = 85°, matrix = 64 × 64, field 
of view = 192 mm). Participants’ in-scan head motion 
was minimal (maximum translation = 2.08 mm, maxi-
mum rotation = 1.86°). Following this scan, we acquired 
an additional 386 EPI volumes for each participant while 
they performed two additional tasks as part of a separate 
study. Finally, we acquired a high-resolution anatomical 
T1-weighted image (1-mm isotropic) and field maps for 
use in image preprocessing.
Image preprocessing
Images were analyzed using Statistical Parametric 
Mapping (Version 8; SPM8; Wellcome Department of 
Cognitive Neurology, London, England) operating in 
MATLAB. Prior to statistical analysis, each participants’ 
images were subjected to six preprocessing steps. First, 
the initial two EPI volumes were discarded to account for 
T1-equilibration effects, and then the remaining EPI vol-
umes were corrected for slice-timing differences. Next, 
within each run, EPI volumes were realigned to the first 
EPI volume of the run, and participants’ T1 structural vol-
ume was coregistered to the mean EPI volume. The 
group-wise diffeomorphic-anatomical-registration-through-
exponentiated-lie registration method included in SPM8 
(Ashburner, 2007) was subsequently used to normalize 
the T1 structural volume to a common group-specific 
space, with subsequent affine registration to Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) space. Finally, all EPI vol-
umes were normalized to MNI space using the deforma-
tion flow fields generated in the previous step, which 
simultaneously resampled volumes (3-mm isotropic) and 
applied spatial smoothing (Gaussian kernel of 8-mm iso-
tropic, full width at half maximum).
Within-subjects contrast estimation
We used a general linear model to estimate the effects of 
performing the social/nonsocial why/how task on the EPI 
time series for each participant. Each model included six 
covariates of interest corresponding to the six cells cre-
ated by crossing factors corresponding to the question 
(why vs. how) and stimulus (nonsocial scenes vs. emo-
tional expressions vs. intentional actions) factors. These 
regressors were defined using a variable-epoch model 
(Grinband, Wager, Lindquist, Ferrera, & Hirsch, 2008), 
with the epochs for each block spanning the onset of the 
first trial and the offset of the last trial. Each model also 
included several covariates of no interest. Two paramet-
ric covariates of no interest were included that modeled 
variability in the amplitude of the blood-oxygen-level-
dependent response that could be explained by differ-
ences in response accuracy and RTs across task blocks 
(regardless of condition). These covariates were deemed 
necessary to account for differences in performance that 
were observed across conditions.
The remaining covariates of no interest included the 
six motion parameters estimated from image realignment 
as well as a predictor for every time point during which 
in-brain global signal change exceeded 2.5 standard 
deviations of the mean global signal change or during 
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which estimated motion exceeded 0.5 mm of translation 
or 0.5 degrees of rotation. The hemodynamic response 
was modeled using the canonical (double-gamma) 
response function, and the predicted and actual signals 
were high-pass-filtered at 1/128 Hz. Finally, all models 
were estimated using the SPM8 RobustWLS toolbox, 
which implements the robust weighted least-squares esti-
mation algorithm (Diedrichsen & Shadmehr, 2005).
Group-level analyses
Our primary analyses were conducted at the group level. 
Given extensive prior work identifying those brain regions 
most reliably associated with social attribution (Spunt & 
Adolphs, 2014; Spunt et al., 2010; Spunt & Lieberman, 
2012a, 2012b; Spunt et al., 2011), we first tested our group-
level hypotheses on a set of independently defined 
regions of interest (ROI). We focused on six left-hemi-
sphere ROIs that were defined based on the why > how 
contrasts reported in Study 1 (N = 29) and Study 3 (N = 
21) of Spunt and Adolphs (2014). These contrast images 
are publicly available for download on the first author’s 
Web site (http://bobspunt.com/whyhow-localizer). ROI 
sections are depicted in Figure 2a (further details can be 
found in Table S3 in the Supplemental Material). For each 
ROI, we extracted percentage signal change (PSC) in the 
six conditions of the experimental design. To test for 
domain generality, we used paired-samples t tests to iden-
tify those regions that independently demonstrated an 
association with the why > how contrast for all three stim-
ulus categories. To test for domain-specificity, we used 
one-sample t tests to identify those regions that showed a 
positive effect in two interaction contrasts: ([whyemotions  > 
howemotions] > [whynonsocial > hownonsocial]) and ([whyactions > 
howactions] > [whynonsocial > hownonsocial]). For each test, we 
report p values corrected for multiple comparisons across 
ROIs using the false-discovery-rate procedure described 
in Benjamini and Yekutieli (2001). Confidence intervals 
(CIs) for these effects were estimated using the bias-cor-
rected and accelerated-percentile method (10,000 random 
samples with replacement; implemented using the 
BOOTCI function in MATLAB).
ROI analyses were followed by whole-brain analyses. 
To determine the extent to which the why > how contrast 
isolates regional activation that is domain general, we sub-
jected the contrast images for each stimulus category to 
one-sample t tests and used the resulting t-statistic images 
to compute the minimum t-statistic image required for valid 
conjunction inference (Nichols, Brett, Andersson, Wager, & 
Poline, 2005). Next, two interaction-contrast images were 
computed, one indexing the relative strength of the why > 
how effect for emotional expressions compared with 
nonsocial scenes ([whyemotions > howemotions] > [whynonsocial > 
hownonsocial]) and one indexing the relative strength of the 
why > how effect for actions compared with nonsocial 
scenes ([whyactions > howactions] >  [whynonsocial > hownonsocial]). 
To determine the extent to which the why > how contrast 
isolates a response that is selective for the social domain, 
we subjected the contrast images for each interaction to 
one-sample t tests and used the resulting t-statistic 
images to compute the minimum t-statistic image. This 
conjunction isolates regions that show a stronger 
response to the why > how contrast for both emotional 
expressions and intentional actions relative to nonsocial 
scenes. Whole-brain analyses were conducted by apply-
ing a cluster-forming (voxel-level) threshold of p < .001 
followed by cluster-level correction for multiple com-
parisons at a family-wise-error rate of .05. For visual pre-
sentation, thresholded t-statistic maps were overlaid on 
the average of the participants’ T1-weighted anatomical 
images.
Individual difference analyses
For each participant, MATLAB was used to score and 
assess the reliability of responses to the personality mea-
sures and to compute measures of mean percentage 
accuracy and RT for the social/nonsocial why/how task. 
Prior to computing accuracy, we omitted trials with no 
response, which were rare (across participants, M = 
0.97%, SD = 1.94%, maximum value for individual partici-
pants = 8.33%). To address negative skewness, we sub-
jected accuracy scores to a Box-Cox transformation (Box 
& Cox, 1964). Mean RT was computed on the distribution 
of correct trials only and after deleting values that were 
greater than 3 standard deviations from the remaining 
distribution mean. (Group-level descriptive statistics are 
reported in Table S1 in the Supplemental Material.)
To examine brain-behavior relationships, we com-
puted each participant’s mean PSC within the dorso-
medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) ROI in each domain’s 
why > how contrast. Then, we used the MATLAB Statistics 
Toolbox to perform a series of robust multiple regression 
analyses that simultaneously modeled the influence of 
DMPFC responses to the two domains on five outcomes 
of interest: attributional accuracy in the social and non-
social domains,2 and the three personality measures 
(Empathy Quotient questionnaire, Social Curiosity Scale, 
and Attributional Com plexity Questionnaire). Robust 
regressions were carried out using iteratively reweighted 
least squares estimated as implemented in the MATLAB 
Statistics Toolbox. (Zero-order Pearson correlations 
among all examined variables are reported in Table S6 in 
the Supplemental Material.)









































































































Fig. 2. Results from the region-of-interest (ROI) and whole-brain analyses. The graphs in (a) show mean percentage signal change from fixation 
baseline as a function of stimulus category and question type, separately for each of the independently defined ROIs that showed an association 
with the why > how contrast for all three stimulus categories (nonsocial scenes, emotional expressions, intentional actions). The sagittal slices in (b) 
and (c) illustrate the results of whole-brain analyses. In (b), the images show regions independently associated with the why > how contrast for all 
three stimulus categories. The image in (c) shows the portion of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) that displayed an elevated response in 
the why > how contrast to attributions about both emotional expressions and intentional actions compared with attributions about nonsocial situa-
tions. For both whole-brain analyses, regions were identified from a group-level (N = 19) search using a cluster-forming threshold of p < .001 and 
a cluster-level family-wise-error rate of .05. Activity is overlaid on the group mean anatomical map at a threshold of p < .005 to show the extent of 
activation. LOFC = lateral orbitofrontal cortex; aSTS = anterior superior temporal sulcus; TPJ = temporoparietal junction.
Results
Domain-general effects
As displayed in Figure 2a, four of the six ROIs examined 
demonstrated evidence of a domain-general association 
with the why > how contrast (see also Table S4 in the 
Supplemental Material). These were the DMPFC, the lat-
eral orbitofrontal cortex (LOFC), the aSTS, and the TPJ. 
As displayed in Figure 2b and listed in Table 2, activa-
tions in each of these regions were also observed in 
whole-brain analyses based on the conjunction of the 
why > how contrast for the three stimulus categories. 
While these findings still leave open the possibility of 
representational differences within the observed regions 
in the way that social and nonsocial attributions corre-
spond with brain-activation patterns (as could be revealed 
through pattern-information analysis, e.g., Kriegeskorte & 
Kievit, 2013), they argue strongly for a broadly similar set 
of psychological processes engaged in both cases.
Effects specific to the social domain
The results for domain-general effects thus suggest that 
many of the brain regions associated with the why > how 
contrast in the social domain are also associated with that 
contrast in the nonsocial domain. In our next analysis, we 
sought to identify those regions demonstrating evidence 
of a response to attributional processing that is specific to 
the social domain. To do so, we capitalized on the fact 
that we operationally defined the social domain in two 
ways: using photographs of emotional facial expressions 
and photographs of intentional hand actions. For a region 
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to be characterized as functionally sensitive to the social 
domain, it should demonstrate this sensitivity in response 
to both emotions and actions. To identify such regions, 
we examined the conjunction of two interaction contrasts: 
([whyemotions > howemotions] > [whynonsocial > hownonsocial]) and 
([whyactions > howactions] > [whynonsocial > hownonsocial]). 
Although every ROI except for the aSTS displayed an ele-
vated response to at least one of the two social-stimulus 
categories (Table S5 in the Supplemental Material), only 
the left DMPFC showed an elevated response to both 
social-stimulus categories, and did so both in ROI and in 
whole-brain analyses (Fig. 2c; Table 2). That is, although 
largely the same area of the DMPFC demonstrated a 
domain-general association with making attributions, this 
association was stronger for attributions made about 
social situations than about nonsocial situations.
Dispositional moderators of DMPFC 
responses
To provide further constraints on interpreting the nature 
of the elevated DMPFC response to social attributions, 
we capitalized on individual variability in performance 
both on the social- and nonsocial-attribution tasks, as 
well as in self-reported personality traits relevant to social 
cognition. We used these factors to rule out a potent 
alternative interpretation of the domain-general effects 
observed in this region. That is, activation of the DMPFC 
in the nonsocial why > how contrast may be caused by 
task-irrelevant social-attributional processing that may 
occur spontaneously during performance of the nonso-
cial-attributional task. This interpretation has been used 
before to explain observations of DMPFC activation in 
nonsocial-reasoning tasks (Van Overwalle, 2011) and is 
made especially viable given the strong human tendency 
to anthropomorphize nonsocial objects and events (Epley 
et al., 2007). Moreover, this could also account for the 
fact that the DMPFC response to nonsocial attributions 
was globally weaker when compared with its response to 
social attributions.
To evaluate this possibility, we tested two hypotheses. 
First, if DMPFC function is irrelevant to the nonsocial-
attribution task, individual differences in the level of 
DMPFC activation to nonsocial attributions should be 
either uncorrelated or negatively correlated with levels of 
performance on the nonsocial-attribution task. Such an 
effect would be consistent with the well-established asso-
ciation of the DMPFC with mind wandering, stimulus-
independent thought, and the default-mode network of 
the brain more broadly (Mason et al., 2007). If instead the 
DMPFC is critical to performance of the nonsocial-attri-
bution task, its levels of activation in response to the 
nonsocial domain should be positively associated with 
making more accurate attributions in that domain. 
Moreover, this association should be evident even when 
accounting for the DMPFC response to attributions in the 
social domain.
To evaluate these alternatives, we used multiple regres-
sion to simultaneously model the influence of domain-
specific DMPFC activation and attributional accuracy in 
both domains (results are shown in Table 3, with zero-
order correlations provided in Table S6). The results 
strongly support the proposition that the DMPFC associa-
tion with attributional processing is domain general: 
DMPFC activation to the nonsocial (but not social) domain 
was uniquely associated with attributional accuracy in the 






Response to why > how questions for all stimulus categories
Anterior superior temporal sulcus Left 124 5.837 −57 0 –21
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex Left 69 5.376 −9 45 51
Lateral orbitofrontal cortex Left 92 5.148 −48 33 –12
Lateral orbitofrontal cortex Left — 4.153 −45 24 15
Temporoparietal junction Left 59 5.043 −51 −69 33
Temporoparietal junction Left — 4.539 −42 −51 21
Stronger response to why > how questions for social than for nonsocial stimuli
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex Left 303 6.245 −9 57 18
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex Left/Right — 5.942 0 51 36
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex Left — 5.346 −9 29 58
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex Right — 4.649 12 57 12
Note: N = 19. The minimum statistic image was cluster-corrected at a family-wise-error rate of .05. MNI = Montreal 
Neurological Institute.
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nonsocial domain, while the DMPFC activation to the 
social (but not nonsocial) domain was uniquely associated 
with attributional accuracy in the social domain. This evi-
dence argues against the possibility that the domain-gen-
eral effects observed in the DMPFC are simply a by-product 
of incidental processing shared across the domains.
If the DMPFC response to nonsocial attribution were to 
reflect spontaneous social cognition, a second prediction 
would be that this task-irrelevant response should be 
strongest in those individuals most inclined to show 
spontaneous social cognition. Indeed, Wagner, Kelley, 
and Heatherton (2011) recently showed that individual 
differences in task-irrelevant DMPFC responses to social 
scenes positively correlate with scores on the Empathy 
Quotient questionnaire. Similarly, we found that DMPFC 
responses to social attributions in our task were uniquely 
positively associated not only with scores on the Empathy 
Quotient questionnaire, but also with self-reported mea-
sures of social curiosity and attributional complexity 
(Table 3). In contrast, the DMPFC response to nonsocial 
attribution demonstrated no unique association with 
these measures. Hence, though the DMPFC response to 
nonsocial attribution was generally weaker than its 
response to social attribution, these secondary analyses 
strongly suggest that it nonetheless comes into play dur-
ing both kinds of attributions and, moreover, does so as 
a function of the relative expertise and performance abil-
ities of each participant with respect to that domain of 
attribution.
Discussion
We observed that most of the brain regions activated by 
social attributions were also activated by nonsocial attri-
butions. Moreover, individual differences in the domain-
specific recruitment of one of these regions—the 
DMPFC—correlated with attributional accuracy in each 
domain. DMPFC also showed an elevated response to 
attributions about social situations, and this socially 
selective response was strongest in those participants 
who reported the highest levels of social expertise. On 
the basis of these findings, we suggest that attributions 
about the social world reflect a specialized use of a 
domain-general cognitive ability.
The regions associated with attributional processing in 
the present study are anatomically similar to those 
observed in neuroimaging studies of social reasoning 
(Amodio & Frith, 2006; Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, 
& Perner, 2014; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). Given 
proposals that these regions may implement processes 
that are dedicated to social cognition (Kennedy & 
Adolphs, 2012; Mitchell, 2009; Van Overwalle, 2011), it 
may be surprising that these regions demonstrated an 
association with attributions about nonsocial situations. 
We believe this apparent discrepancy with prior research 
is explained by several distinctive features of the present 
study’s methods.
First, we used a factorial design to independently 
manipulate attributional processing (why vs. how ques-
tions) and stimulus domain (social vs. nonsocial scenes). 
This allowed us to conduct independent tests for attribu-
tion-specific brain activity within each domain. Previous 
researchers either could not or did not conduct such tests 
and instead relied on directly comparing brain activity elic-
ited by judgments of social and nonsocial stimuli (e.g., 
Martin & Weisberg, 2003; Mason et al., 2010; Mitchell et al., 
2002; Mitchell et al., 2005). As the present findings suggest, 
brain activity observed in such direct comparisons could 
be caused by social and nonsocial stimuli placing different 
demands on the same cognitive process.
Second, normative data allowed us to assess the accu-
racy of participants’ attributional judgments. This data, in 
turn, allowed us to demonstrate that, in addition to show-
ing a domain-general association with attributional pro-
cessing, DMPFC activity also shows a domain-general 
association with attributional accuracy. This degree of 
experimental control over both stimulus and response 
was largely absent from previous neuroimaging studies 
Table 3. Results of Robust Multiple Regression Analyses of Domain-Specific Activation in the Dorsomedial Prefrontal 
Cortex (DMPFC) as a Predictor of Individual Difference Outcomes
Outcome predicted
Nonsocial domain Social domain
β t(16) p β t(16) p
Accuracy: nonsocial attribution 0.55 [0.11, 0.99] 2.65 .017 0.24 [–0.20, 0.69] 1.17 .260
Accuracy: social attribution 0.14 [–0.26, 0.54] 0.75 .466 0.67 [0.27, 1.07] 3.56 .003
Empathy −0.37 [–0.78, 0.05] −1.86 .081 0.59 [0.18, 1.01] 3.02 .008
Social curiosity −0.14 [–0.56, 0.27] −0.73 .474 0.69 [0.28, 1.11] 3.52 .003
Attributional complexity −0.30 [–0.74, 0.14] −1.44 .170 0.62 [0.18, 1.06] 3.01 .008
Note: All five regression models contained the same two predictors: DMPFC activation to the why > how contrast in the nonsocial domain, 
and DMPFC activation to the why > how contrast in the social domain. Values in brackets are 95% confidence intervals. The DMPFC region 
was defined using the same region of interest used to examine within-subjects effects.
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comparing social and nonsocial reasoning (Baetens, Ma, 
Steen, & Van Overwalle, 2014; Mitchell et al., 2005). 
Given that people spontaneously generate social inter-
pretations of nonsocial stimuli (Epley et al., 2007), it is 
difficult to interpret brain activity associated with nonso-
cial reasoning during tasks in which participant responses 
are unconstrained or unmeasured.
Finally, we acknowledged that the social world is het-
erogeneous and therefore operationally defined it with 
two distinct classes of human behavior: emotional expres-
sions and intentional actions. The importance of this is 
demonstrated by the fact that several regions showed a 
socially selective response to attributions about either 
emotions or actions, but not to both (see Table S5). This 
strengthens the conclusion that the DMPFC is selective 
for the abstract domain shared by emotions and actions, 
namely, the social domain.
What domain-general process could implement social 
attributions? One answer emerges from neuroimaging 
studies of semantic-memory use (Binder & Desai, 2011). 
In a meta-analysis of 120 fMRI studies, Binder, Desai, 
Graves, and Conant (2009) identified a network that 
includes the set of regions that showed a domain-general 
association with attribution in the present study. Other 
reviews and meta-analyses have identified similar ana-
tomical correspondences across mental-state reasoning 
tasks and task groups with strong semantic-memory 
demands, for instance, narrative comprehension, prospec-
tion, and autobiographical memory (Mar, 2011; Schacter 
et al., 2012; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009). Such data fit with 
a view of folk attribution as heavily dependent on the 
efficient retrieval, selection, and integration of semantic 
memory, that is, world knowledge that is not reliably tied 
to observable objects and events (Fletcher et al., 1986). 
Hence, social and nonsocial attribution appear to be iso-
morphic uses of semantic memory, in that both demand 
comprehending the contents of a visual scene (e.g., smil-
ing face, blooming flower) using relatively abstract causal 
schemata (e.g., friendliness, Spring season).
The plausibility of this domain-general view depends 
on its ability to account for the socially selective response 
of the DMPFC to attributional processing. Our individual-
differences analyses provide valuable constraint on inter-
preting this effect. First, although nonsocial attributions 
elicited modest DMPFC response across participants, 
individual differences in the magnitude of this response 
nevertheless uniquely correlated with attributional accu-
racy in the nonsocial domain. Second, individual differ-
ences in responses to social attribution were uniquely 
associated not only with attributional accuracy in the 
social domain, but also with self-reported levels of empa-
thy, social curiosity, and attributional complexity. In other 
words, those individuals who demonstrated the greatest 
ability in a given domain also tended to show the stron-
gest DMPFC responses to that domain.
To accommodate these findings, a semantic-memory 
account need assume only that most people are substan-
tially interested in and knowledgeable about the causal 
factors at play in their social worlds. Such depth of 
domain-specific knowledge would be predicted to place 
strong demands on the executive aspects of semantic-
memory use that includes the retrieval, selection, and 
integration of conceptual knowledge. Regions of the 
DMPFC have been linked with these functions in both 
nonsocial and social semantic-memory tasks (Binder & 
Desai, 2011; Binder et al., 2009; Goel, Gold, Kapur, & 
Houle, 1997; Jenkins & Mitchell, 2010; Mitchell, 2009; 
Satpute, Badre, & Ochsner, 2014). Moreover, neuroimag-
ing studies of social reasoning indicate that the DMPFC 
plays a central executive role in the use of social knowl-
edge (Meyer, Spunt, Berkman, Taylor, & Lieberman, 2012; 
Spunt & Lieberman, 2013). Hence, in the same way that 
the face-selective response of the fusiform face area may 
be explained by acquired perceptual expertise (Tarr & 
Gauthier, 2000), the socially selective response of the 
DMPFC during attributional processing may be best 
explained by conceptual expertise acquired as a natural 
consequence of living in a world that is thoroughly and 
inescapably social (Barrett & Satpute, 2013; Fiske & 
Taylor, 1984; Fletcher et al., 1986; Grelotti et al., 2002; 
Roy, Shohamy, & Wager, 2012). Future studies will be 
needed to evaluate additional predictions of a concep-
tual-expertise account of attributional processing. For 
instance, DMPFC selectivity for the social domain should 
be atypical in psychiatric conditions that severely impede 
the acquisition of social expertise (Grelotti et al., 2002; 
Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012). In fact, work is currently 
being conducted in our lab to investigate this possibility 
in a group of high-functioning adults with autism. A sec-
ond prediction regards acquired expertise in (nonsocial) 
knowledge domains, for instance medicine. In such 
cases, DMPFC selectivity for attributions within that 
domain should parametrically track individual differ-
ences in domain-specific experience (e.g., year in medi-
cal school) and performance (e.g., diagnostic accuracy).
The present study suggests that social attributions rely 
on a process, possibly centralized in the DMPFC, that can 
be used to make attributions about nonsocial situations. 
By showing only this, our findings remain consistent with 
proposals that the basic cognitive mechanisms support-
ing social reasoning evolved specifically in response to 
the increasing complexity of primate social structures 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Dunbar, 1998; Herrmann, Call, 
Hernandez-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007) and later 
were repurposed for use in other domains. In fact, the 
complexity and heterogeneity of the social world may be 
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the very reason why this ability can be flexibly repur-
posed for use in other domains.
Indeed, Herrmann and colleagues (2007) reached a 
similar conclusion in a study comparing the social and 
nonsocial cognitive skills of 2.5-year-old human children 
with those of chimpanzees. While the children generally 
outperformed the chimpanzees in the social but not the 
nonsocial domains, there was one nonsocial skill area in 
which the children exceled: causal understanding. On 
the basis of this finding, Herrmann and colleagues specu-
late that “what is distinctively human is not social-cultural 
cognition as a specialized domain, as we have hypothe-
sized. Rather, what may be distinctive is the ability to 
understand unobserved causal forces in general, includ-
ing (as a special case) the mental states of others as 
causes of behavior” (p. 1365). While the findings pre-
sented here support such a “special case” perspective on 
social-causal attribution, they suggest that of all the pos-
sible uses humans have for this ability, its use in under-
standing the social world is the most important.
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1. Both items can be interpreted as references to a stereotypi-
cal stalking behavior: “I like to stand at the window and watch 
what my neighbors are doing” (Item 10) and “I like to look into 
other people’s windows” (Item 11). Excluding these items did 
not substantively change the results.
2. Given that DMPFC activity was theorized to be functionally 
relevant for answering only why questions, attributional accu-
racy was defined by the percentage of correct responses to why 
questions. The validity of the why > how accuracy difference 
depends on an assumption we were not prepared to make, 
namely, that accuracy and DMPFC activity during how ques-
tions will have a negative association that is as strong as the 
predicted positive association between accuracy and DMPFC 
activity during why questions.
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